I believe we will see yield wars once again. If youâve been around DeFi long enough, you know that TVL is a vanity metric until it isnât.
Because in a hyper-competitive, modular world of AMMs, perps, and lending protocols, the only thing that really matters is who controls liquidity routing. Not who owns the protocol. Not even who emits the most rewards.
But who convinces liquidity providers (LPs) deposit and make sure that TVL is sticky.
And thatâs where the bribe economy begins.
What used to be informal vote-buying (Curve wars, Convex, etc.) has now professionalized into full-blown liquidity coordination marketplaces, complete with order books, dashboards, incentive routing layers, and in some cases, gamified participation mechanics.
Itâs becoming one of the most strategically important layers in the entire DeFi stack.
Back in 2021â2022, protocols would bootstrap liquidity the old way:
But this model is fundamentally flawed, itâs reactive. Every new protocol competes against an invisible cost: the opportunity cost of existing capital flows.
I. The Origin of Yield Wars: Curve and the Rise of Vote Markets
The concept of Yield Wars started becoming tangible with the Curve Wars, beginning in 2021.
Curve Financeâs Unique Design
Curve introduced vote-escrowed (ve) tokenomics, where users could lock $CRV (Curveâs native token) for up to 4 years in exchange for veCRV, which granted:
This created a meta-game around emissions:
Then came Convex Finance
Lesson #1: He who controls the gauge controls liquidity.
II. Meta-Incentives and Bribe Markets
The First Bribe Economy
What began as a manual effort to influence emissions evolved into a full-blown market where:
The Expansion Beyond Curve
Lesson #2: Yield is no longer about APY, itâs about programmable meta-incentives.
III. How Yield Wars Are Fought
Hereâs how protocols compete in this meta-game:
Today, protocols like @turtleclubhouse and @roycoprotocoldirects that liquidity: instead of emitting blindly, they auction off incentives to LPs based on demand signals.
In essence: âYou bring liquidity, weâll route incentives where they matter most.â
This unlocks a second-order effect: Protocols no longer have to brute-force liquidity, instead they coordinate it.
Quietly one of the most effective bribe markets no oneâs talking about. Their pools are often embedded in partnerships and have TVL exceeding $580M, with dual-token emissions, weighted bribes, and a surprisingly sticky LP base.
Their model emphasizes fair value redistribution, meaning emissions are steered by vote, and by real-time capital velocity metrics.
Itâs a smarter flywheel: LPs get rewarded relative to their capitalâs effectiveness, not just size. For once, efficiency is incentivized.
In a single month, it surged over $2.6 billion in TVL, a wild 267,000% month-over-month growth.
While some of that is âpoints-fueledâ capital, what matters is the infrastructure behind it:
Hereâs what makes this narrative more than just a yield game:
If you decide where the liquidity goes, you influence who survives the next market cycle.
I believe we will see yield wars once again. If youâve been around DeFi long enough, you know that TVL is a vanity metric until it isnât.
Because in a hyper-competitive, modular world of AMMs, perps, and lending protocols, the only thing that really matters is who controls liquidity routing. Not who owns the protocol. Not even who emits the most rewards.
But who convinces liquidity providers (LPs) deposit and make sure that TVL is sticky.
And thatâs where the bribe economy begins.
What used to be informal vote-buying (Curve wars, Convex, etc.) has now professionalized into full-blown liquidity coordination marketplaces, complete with order books, dashboards, incentive routing layers, and in some cases, gamified participation mechanics.
Itâs becoming one of the most strategically important layers in the entire DeFi stack.
Back in 2021â2022, protocols would bootstrap liquidity the old way:
But this model is fundamentally flawed, itâs reactive. Every new protocol competes against an invisible cost: the opportunity cost of existing capital flows.
I. The Origin of Yield Wars: Curve and the Rise of Vote Markets
The concept of Yield Wars started becoming tangible with the Curve Wars, beginning in 2021.
Curve Financeâs Unique Design
Curve introduced vote-escrowed (ve) tokenomics, where users could lock $CRV (Curveâs native token) for up to 4 years in exchange for veCRV, which granted:
This created a meta-game around emissions:
Then came Convex Finance
Lesson #1: He who controls the gauge controls liquidity.
II. Meta-Incentives and Bribe Markets
The First Bribe Economy
What began as a manual effort to influence emissions evolved into a full-blown market where:
The Expansion Beyond Curve
Lesson #2: Yield is no longer about APY, itâs about programmable meta-incentives.
III. How Yield Wars Are Fought
Hereâs how protocols compete in this meta-game:
Today, protocols like @turtleclubhouse and @roycoprotocoldirects that liquidity: instead of emitting blindly, they auction off incentives to LPs based on demand signals.
In essence: âYou bring liquidity, weâll route incentives where they matter most.â
This unlocks a second-order effect: Protocols no longer have to brute-force liquidity, instead they coordinate it.
Quietly one of the most effective bribe markets no oneâs talking about. Their pools are often embedded in partnerships and have TVL exceeding $580M, with dual-token emissions, weighted bribes, and a surprisingly sticky LP base.
Their model emphasizes fair value redistribution, meaning emissions are steered by vote, and by real-time capital velocity metrics.
Itâs a smarter flywheel: LPs get rewarded relative to their capitalâs effectiveness, not just size. For once, efficiency is incentivized.
In a single month, it surged over $2.6 billion in TVL, a wild 267,000% month-over-month growth.
While some of that is âpoints-fueledâ capital, what matters is the infrastructure behind it:
Hereâs what makes this narrative more than just a yield game:
If you decide where the liquidity goes, you influence who survives the next market cycle.